``Decoy Databases: Analyzing Attacks on Public Facing Databases''
Yuqian Song, Georgios Smaragdakis, and Harm Griffioen.
ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) 2025.

Abstract:
Databases often store sensitive organizational data but may be exposed to the Internet through misconfiguration or vulnerabilities. However, such databases may be unintentionally exposed to the Internet, e.g., due to misconfiguration or be vulnerable. To study real-world attacks on public-facing database management systems (DBMS), we deployed 278 honeypots over 20 days in March–April 2024. Our 220 low-interaction honeypots emulate MySQL, MSSQL, PostgreSQL, and Redis, revealing that scanning activity is relatively low (approx. 3,000 IPs), but brute-force attempts are persistent. We also deploy 58 medium/high-interaction honeypots, which reveal three distinct types of exploitation: (i) direct attacks on the database management system to manipulate the database, (ii) ransom-driven attacks that copy and delete the targeted data, and (iii) use the database as an attack vector to take over the underlying system. Our findings highlight that DBMS-targeted attacks are distinct from those on other Internet-facing systems and deserve focused attention.




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