

# Characterizing and Mitigating Phishing Attacks at ccTLD Scale

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## Abstract

Phishing on the web is a model of social engineering and an attack vector for getting access to sensitive and financial data of individuals and corporations. Phishing has been identified as one of the prime cyber threats in recent years. With the goal to effectively identify and mitigate phishing as early as possible, we present in this paper a longitudinal analysis of phishing attacks from the vantage point of three country-code top-level domain (ccTLD) registries that manage more than 8 million active domains – namely the Netherlands’ .nl, Ireland’s .ie, and Belgium’s .be. We perform a longitudinal analysis on phishing attacks spanning up to 10 years, based on more than 28 thousand phishing domains. Our results show two major attack strategies: national companies and organizations are far more often impersonated using malicious registered domains under their country’s own ccTLD, which enables better mimicry of the impersonated company. In stark contrast, international companies are impersonated using any domains that can be compromised, reducing overall mimicry but bearing no registration and financial costs. Although most research works focus on detecting new domain names, we show that 80% of phishing attacks in the studied ccTLDs employ compromised domain names. We find banks, financial institutions, and high-tech giant companies at the top of the most impersonated targets. We also show the impact of ccTLDs’ registration and abuse handling policies on preventing and mitigating phishing attacks, and that mitigation is complex and performed at both web and DNS level at different intermediaries. Last, our results provide a unique opportunity for ccTLDs to compare and revisit their policies and impacts, with the goal of improving mitigation procedures.

## CCS Concepts

• Security and privacy → Phishing; • Networks → Web protocol security; Naming and addressing; • Information systems → Electronic commerce;

## Keywords

Phishing, DNS, ccTLD, Registry, Mitigation, Policy

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## 1 Introduction

Phishing is an online scam enticing users to share private or financial information using social engineering and other fraudulent tactics. Web phishing is among the most popular forms of phishing, where a user is maliciously redirected to a website under a criminal group’s control, e.g., by clicking a link in a text or e-mail message.

Various security and investigative organizations have identified phishing as one of the most important cyber threats. Phishing is the top digital crime type identified by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in its 2023 annual report [79]. They report more than 300 thousand complaints and more than US\$160 million in losses that were directly attributed to phishing, and hundreds of millions of losses to Personal Data Breaches that utilized phishing as a social engineering and attack vector tactic in 2022 alone. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has also identified phishing as one of the most important cyber threats to national security [21]. The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) also ranks phishing as one of the top three cyber threats in its Threat Landscape for 2023 highlighting that “phishing is once again the most common vector for initial access” [20]



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for individuals, corporations, and governments in Europe. Reports from other organizations around the world conclude that phishing continues to be one of the most harmful cyber threats today [40–42].

Previous works characterizing phishing attacks have been restricted to specific impersonated companies and relatively short time frames. For instance, by analyzing web server logs, Oest et al. [65] analyzed a year’s worth of phishing data targeting a large, undisclosed payment provider. In another study, Bijmans et al. [11] focused on phishing attacks against ten banks in the Netherlands over five months, identifying 1,363 domains used in these attacks by analyzing certificate transparency logs [13].

In this paper, we address data and timeframe limitations by collaborating directly with country-code TLD (ccTLD) registries, which possess the necessary historical and longitudinal datasets. We partner with three European ccTLDs operators: the Netherlands’ .nl (managed by SIDN [70]), Ireland’s .ie (managed by .IE Registry [38]), and Belgium’s .be (managed by DNS Belgium [10]).

This collaboration allows us to access longitudinal datasets spanning up to 10 years, including phishing blocklists, domain name registration records, and active and passive DNS and HTTP measurements. In total, we characterize *28,754 phishing domains used in attacks against 1,233 companies from 86 countries*.

Our study also allows us to perform “natural experiments,” *i.e.*, non-controlled experiments for variables determined by ccTLDs in the past, to understand the impact of ccTLD registration and phishing mitigation policies. For the first time, it is also possible to study the influence of ccTLD policies on phishing mitigation in the long chain of intermediaries that includes DNS providers, hosting providers, registries, and registrars.

Our contributions can be summarized as follows:

- We perform a longitudinal analysis spanning up to 10 years for the three ccTLD registries, covering more than 28 thousand domains that were used as attack vectors for web phishing attacks.
- Our analysis shows that there are two phishing strategies (§4). National companies are often impersonated using newly registered domains. This class of attacks seems to leverage users’ brand trust and fluency in the local official language. In stark contrast, international companies are typically impersonated by old domains, likely compromised websites. These companies are typically global brands that are attacked by criminals that exploit legitimate domains and without the cost or burden of registering new domains.
- We evaluate the market segments and show that banks, financial institutions, and technology companies are most impersonated in both phishing strategies (§4). Our analysis also shows that 11% of the impersonated companies account for more than 58% of all second-level domains (SLDs) used for phishing attacks. We show that compromised domains dominate the phishing landscape, contributing to more than 80% of SLDs that are weaponized in phishing attacks.
- We demonstrate how the ccTLD registration policy has an impact on reducing phishing activity (§4). Restricted registration virtually eliminates phishing attacks that utilize new maliciously registered domains, but it does not prevent attacks using compromised domain names, which form the bulk of the attacks.
- Our analysis shows that mitigation is complex and varies significantly depending on the ccTLD registry and its policies (§5). We see that DNS and web mitigation are often used independently and simultaneously, and the registry can only cover the DNS mitigation part.
- We present a call for action (§6) for the research and operations communities. First, we need more research on detecting compromised domains, given they form the bulk of attacks and most studies focus on new domain names. Secondly, we demonstrate that ccTLDs should share threat intelligence given companies from one country are often attacked using domains from another country’s ccTLD. Lastly, our results present a unique opportunity for registries to compare each other’s practices. These results are under discussion within the three ccTLDs, spanning legal, management, and abuse handling departments. Consequently, policy adjustments may be implemented to enhance abuse mitigation.

## 2 Background

### 2.1 ccTLD registry operations

Our work leverages data from three ccTLD registries: .nl, .ie, and .be. A DNS registry’s main task is to run the domain registration process, curating a registration database that lists details about registered domains under their ccTLD. This includes the registrant’s personal data (name, address, e-mail), registration and expiration dates and the domain’s associated authoritative DNS servers.

*Domain registration:* It starts with a *registrant* (*e.g.*, a person) requesting a *registrar* (*e.g.*, GoDaddy) to register a domain name with a registry (*e.g.*, Verisign for .com). The registrar then executes this request on behalf of the registrant, once payment and other checks are cleared. Domain registrations can also be requested by resellers, which are intermediaries between a registrant and registrar. Thus, the registrar will register on behalf of resellers. To provide a perspective on the size of this industry, the .nl zone encompasses over 1k+ accredited registrars and 46k+ resellers.

*Registration policy:* In our study, both .nl and .be have open registration policies, while .ie has a restricted registration policy [37] – which means that only individuals and businesses related to Ireland can register .ie domain names (having an ID, passport, or business relation), whereas .nl and .be are open to anyone.


Domains are typically registered for a period of time, often one year, although .nl allows for registration periods of three and six months as well, with the option for renewal thereafter. Once registered, domain names are inserted into the DNS *zone file* [56], which contains the authoritative name servers for all delegated domains under the TLD. These zone files serve as input for *authoritative DNS servers*, which are a type of DNS server which knows the “contents of the zone from local knowledge” [29]. With this information, a domain name can be resolved by *recursive resolvers*, which, on behalf of users, map domain names to IP addresses.

### 2.2 Evaluated ccTLDs and other TLDs

As can be seen in Table 1, the demographics of the countries as well as the registration policies and pricing for the evaluated ccTLDs differ. In total, the ccTLDs we evaluate in this study have more than 8M active domain names.

**Table 1: ccTLDs overview.**

ccTLD	.nl	.ie	.be
# Domains	6.1M	330.1k	1.7M
Registration Policy	Open	Restricted	Open
Country Population	17.5M	4.9M	11.5M
Domains/1k Inhabitants	350	67	147
Domain cost price (€)	3.55	1.25	4.00
Official Languages	1	2	3
GDP per capita (€)	61k	105k	53k


**Figure 1: Phishing domains life cycle.**

*Other TLDs:* The largest *generic* TLD (gTLD) is `.com`, which has 157M domain names, followed by `.net`, with 12M (as of July 18, 2024) [81] – however, both of those are *generic* TLDs used globally. Our ccTLDs are primarily used by businesses and individuals in their respective countries. Germany’s `.de` is the largest ccTLD (17.4M in 2022 [17]), followed by The United Kingdom’s `.uk` (9.1M in 2024 [63]). `.nl` is the third-largest ccTLD (6.1M). While many TLDs do not disclose their size publicly, some industry reports exist [12, 19], although often incomplete. Both `.nl` and `.be` are popular in their own countries, whereas in Ireland many companies often opt to use `.com` domain names instead of `.ie`.

### 2.3 Phishing domain types

Phishing attacks resemble aggressive mimicry in the biological world, where the mimics *deceive* their prey [60], embodying the proverbial “wolf in sheep’s clothing” scenario.

We observe two primary categories of phishing domain names: *maliciously registered* and *compromised* domains [14, 49, 52, 55, 72]. Maliciously registered domains are those in which attackers register it themselves and take care of the associated steps – configuring its DNS and hosting the phishing website (Figure 1). These domains may be immediately used after registration to carry out attacks, or the attacker may wait for some time before carrying out the attacks – which is referred to as “aged domains”.

Compromised domains, on the other hand, occur when attackers exploit someone else’s website to host a phishing site. They resemble parasitic relationships in the natural world, where parasites live off (or in) another organism [67]. Typically, this is achieved by exploiting vulnerabilities in websites, particularly those using susceptible content management systems (CMSes) such as WordPress

and Joomla [78, 80]. While it is the website that is exploited, for consistency, we refer to them in the paper as “compromised domain names”. We include examples of three real-world phishing sites in in §A of an extended version of this paper [59].

*Phishing Kits:* Phishing sites can be built with the help of phishing kits and phishing as a service, with templates tailored to specific organizations [11, 25]. LabHost, a phishing-as-a-service provider busted in 2024 [22, 64, 77], offered convincing phishing sites mimicking 170 organizations covering “financial institutions, postal delivery services and telecommunication services providers, among others” [22], with subscription fees averaging US\$ 249 per month.

After that, the phisher must actively promote the phishing URLs, typically resorting to spam methods (e.g., e-mail, social networking). This initiates a race against time, as the detection of phishing activities may become imminent, which may lead to mitigation.

### 2.4 Domain name price influence in abuse

Previous research and industry reports highlight that pricing is an important factor for attackers when choosing the TLD and registrar for domain name registrations. Free SLDs were previously offered by Freenom, which caused many crooks to use them for phishing [1, 2, 66]. After being sued by Meta [66], Freenom stopped offering free SLDs, and at the moment of this writing, no registry offers free SLDs.

When China’s `.cn` registry changed its registration requirements (from open to requiring IDs to register domains) and increased the price roughly tenfold, the volume of blacklisted `.cn` domain names reduced while the number of Russia’s `.ru` spamming domains increased [53]. These results suggest migration from TLD responding to policy and price change (waterbed effect).

Another study [45] pointed a shift from abuse from legacy gTLDs (e.g., `.com`) to new gTLDs (e.g., `.xyz`) – some of the new gTLDs offer domains for less than US\$1. For comparison, a `.com` SLD costs US\$10.26 [18]. The results suggest that low domain price correlates with abuse, although they could not fully confirm this due to a lack of comprehensive pricing data. It is important to note that pricing is only relevant to maliciously registered domains. Compromised domain do not incur any registration costs on the attacker side.

### 2.5 Phishing mitigation

Phishing mitigation can occur at two application levels: DNS and Web, or both. At the DNS level, the domain name used in phishing can be *deleted* from the namespace and from the zone file. It can also be *suspended*, where it is deleted (delisted) from the DNS zone but not from the namespace. Lastly, it can remain in the zone and namespace, but have its authoritative DNS servers (NS records) changed to a safe server.

In all three methods, the domain name will not resolve any longer to the phishing website. These mitigation options can be performed at the reseller (if there is one), registrar, or at the registry. These entities have the technical and legal capabilities of doing so.

At the Web application level, the phishing website can be cleaned up. This action can be done by the hosting providers and webmasters. It is also important to patch vulnerable web software for compromised domains, otherwise they can be exploited again.

*Mitigation per domain type.* Compromised domains and maliciously registered ones require different mitigation strategies [72]. Compromised websites should not be mitigated at the DNS level, given it will make the website unreachable, impairing the operations of legitimate websites. Web mitigation is recommended first (Cleanup in Figure 1). For malicious domain names, it is not enough to mitigate at one application level: if a domain is suspended, the attacker can register a new domain pointing to the phishing website. If the website is mitigated, then the attacker can redirect the domain name to another website. That said, one mitigation type partially solves the problems during an attack. Mitigating at both DNS and Web levels increases the economic cost for the attacker, reducing the incentives to use the chosen DNS zone. If deleted, the domain name subsequently expires, eventually reentering the pool of available domains for registration, after a quarantine period. This period lasts 40 days for .nl and .be, and 45 days for .ie.

Other mitigation methods include blocklists [50], such as Google SafeBrowsing [24], which warn users in their browsers about the threat. Their efficacy is predicated in the ability and speed in which phishing websites are detected by the blocklist. Upstream providers, which are not technically responsible for content, may pressure clients to mitigate phishing attacks or cut service [30, 46, 51, 75].

## 2.6 TLDs and abuse handling policy

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) oversees the delegation of TLDs to registries [39]. ICANN’s policies differ for country code TLDs (ccTLDs) and generic TLDs (gTLDs, e.g., .com, .org) due to their unique characteristics.

ccTLDs are generally regarded as national resources. As such, ccTLDs lack a contract with ICANN, preventing ICANN from enforcing abuse mitigation procedures. Instead, ccTLDs and ICANN have *formal agreements*, known as “Exchange of Letters” [35], where registries pledge to properly operate their country’s ccTLD zone. These agreements do not encompass abuse handling, allowing ccTLDs to establish their own abuse handling policies and procedure in consultation with the local Internet community.

Generic TLD (gTLD) registries, however, have a *contractual relationship* with ICANN [34]. Proposed amendments in Dec. 2023, if ratified, will mandate gTLD registries to proactively mitigate abuse ([36], and §4 in [33]). ICANN also requires that its accredited registrars – which are able to register gTLD domains such as .com must adhere to specific abuse handling guidelines (§3.18 in [32]).

## 2.7 ccTLDs’ phishing handling procedures

Table 2 summarizes the phishing mitigation procedures employed by the ccTLDs we evaluate in this paper. Their detailed abuse mitigation policy is covered in §B in [59].

*Phishing detection:* all three ccTLDs utilize abuse reports provided by Netcraft and accept external abuse complaints. In addition, .ie manually verifies each registration due to its restricted registration policy, before the domain registration is finalized.

.nl and .be, in turn, in the evaluated period, employed both manual and automated (ML-based) verification. During the evaluated period, .be used a rule-based system (now replaced by an ML-based one [9]). Such system flags roughly 30% of new domain registrations to be followed-up by a registrant identity verification. These

**Table 2: ccTLDs phishing mitigation procedure.**

	.nl	.ie	.be
<b>Detection</b>			
Netcraft	✓	✓	✓
Complaints	✓	✓	✓
Manual verification	✓	✓ (strict)	✓
ML-based verification	✓	–	✓
<b>Notification</b>			
	3rd-party (Netcraft) and Registrar	3rd-party (Netcraft)	Registrant and Registrar
<b>Phishing Mitigation</b>			
Suspend	✓ After 66h	✓ After 30 days	✓ ASAP
Delete	✓	✓ After two weeks	✓
Change NS	–	–	✓

.be domains are not delegated in the zone until this procedure is concluded. As such, this inhibits many potential phishing attacks – but we cannot measure it given our datasets only show confirmed attacks. .nl, in turn, has manual and automated processes that flag domains similarly, but differently from .be, it does not prevent delegation: the registration verification process happens *after* the domain is delegated.

*Phishing notifications:* Regarding notifications, all ccTLDs directly notify the respective registrars. .nl and .ie also hire the notification service from Netcraft’s, which informs all parties known to be associated with the phishing attack, including DNS and upstream providers, and registrars. .be is the only one to also notify the registrants.

Moreover, .nl also notifies Netcraft of phishing sites its analysts detected independently – and therefore uses Netcraft’s notification systems to notify the responsible parties. In this period, 1,552 .nl from the 25,389 SLDs (6.1%) were detected by .nl analysts and added to the Netcraft list.

*Phishing mitigation:* all three ccTLDs have policies granting them the right to remove domain names from their zone and delete them from their namespace, as discussed in §2.5 and shown in Table 2.

Each registry, however, has different moments to suspend domains. .be is the fastest, suspending as soon as possible after the Netcraft notification. .nl, in turn, will wait for 66h before suspending the domain [69]. .ie, in turn, will suspend a domain after 30 days if the registrant doesn’t respond to contact attempts, or exceptionally within two business days if deemed harmful.

.be has a policy to first suspend the NS records and delete a domain name after two weeks if the registrant is unable to prove its legitimacy – so the initial mitigation (suspension) is followed by a deletion. In its transparency report, .nl states that it took down 9,305 domain names in 2024 – not only related to phishing, but multiple types of abuse [71].

## 3 Datasets

We leverage two main types of datasets in this study: a phishing blocklist (§3.1) and the registries’ own datasets (§3.2).

**Table 3: Netcraft phishing blacklist dataset.**

	.nl	.ie	.be
Starting date	2013-09-16	2019-07-30	2019-08-29
Ending date	2023-06-05	2023-08-25	2023-06-05
Period	~10 years	~4 years	~4 years
Domains (SLDs)	25,389	555	2,810
URLs	137,880	4,542	27,346

### 3.1 Netcraft phishing blacklist

We begin our analysis with Netcraft [62], a commercial phishing blacklist and a leading industry threat intelligence provider. It catalogs URLs associated with phishing attacks, along with pertinent metadata. Netcraft is well-regarded among registries for its low false positive rates. We use only a *subset* of Netcraft’s phishing blacklist, focusing on phishing attacks occurring within the ccTLDs relevant to this study – each registry has a paid subscription to only events in their zone.


*Netcraft detection methods:* Netcraft’s precise detection methods are proprietary (their “secret sauce”). According to their website [61], they utilize various data sources including DNS queries, web crawls, app store searches, multiple search engines and social media searches, Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) [47], and X.509 certificate analysis used in TLS connections.

We contacted their engineers and they said they employ multiple vantage points across the globe, “including residential and mobile networks as well as other techniques like user agent cloaking”. Their tools also interact with forms, and according to them, their “automation to appear as if it were a real visitor is sufficient to avoid CAPTCHA interstitial pages.” After detection, “a mixture of automation and human expertise is used to validate phishing URLs and automation is responsible for the large majority of these”. Given we do not have access to their detection systems, we cannot verify these claims, we only use their final output: the blacklist itself.

Table 3 shows our phishing datasets – the subsets of the Netcraft blacklist for phishing, for each ccTLD. We see roughly 25k SLDs over a 10-year period for .nl, 555 for .ie, and 2,810 for .be, both over a 4-year period. Given a single SLD may have multiple phishing URLs, we see a larger number of URLs.

Figure 2 shows the timeseries of SLDs used for phishing attacks for the ccTLDs we evaluate. We also include a linear regression of the number of monthly SLDs in Figure 2, showing a decrease in the number of SLDs used over the year for all ccTLDs.

*Alternative phishing feeds.* Besides Netcraft, we also evaluated another feed, namely the Anti Phishing Working Group (APWG) phishing feed [5], for the same period. We found that APWG listed far fewer domains than Netcraft (roughly 10% for .nl, Table 4), and that most of them were already included in Netcraft. The extra domains provided by APWG would account for 2.2% of the total for .nl. Given that most of them were included and did not have manual validation of the remaining entries, we decide to not use them in this study.

**Figure 2: Phishing dataset timeseries (SLDs)****Table 4: Netcraft and APWG SLDs listed.**

	.nl	.ie	.be
Netcraft	25,389	555	2,810
APWG	2,770	280	297
$\cap$	2,199	26	222
APWG only	571	254	75

*Limitations.* As any blacklist, the datasets we use are from a reactive nature – meaning that they report only known attacks [51]. This reactive approach leaves a window of vulnerability between the emergence of a new threat and its eventual addition to the blacklist.

### 3.2 Registries’ datasets

We use datasets available at the registries, including the domain names registration database, authoritative DNS traffic and for .nl, we have web crawls of domain names. These web-crawl datasets are constructed using an in-house web crawler at the .nl registry (DMap[82]). This crawler scans the entire .nl zone monthly and all newly registered domains every 8 hours, for a period of 30 days. This crawler uses a headless Chromium browser to retrieve web data associated with domain names.

Compared to other studies, which typically relied on partial information about domain name registration (using whois [15] or commercial services), our datasets cover all details for every domain in the DNS zone, both current and historical. Access to these datasets is governed by the European and national laws of each ccTLD’s country’s jurisdiction. It is important to note that during the course of this research, while collaboration was ongoing, data was not shared among the ccTLDs. Instead, we shared code to analyze the datasets locally.


*Dataset sharing:* Unfortunately, we cannot share our raw datasets, only aggregated ones (see Netcraft’s .nl phishing counts in [48]). The Netcraft blacklist is a commercial dataset and cannot be publicly released. Our registries’ datasets contain personally identifiable information (PII), which prohibits public release due to the EU’s GDPR and national laws.

## 4 Impersonated companies

ccTLDs, by definition, have a strong association with their countries: governments use them in their e-gov services [74], as well as local

**Table 5: Targeted companies and market segments per ccTLD.**

	.nl	.ie	.be
Targeted companies	1,057	206	546
Local	58	8	33
International	942	198	460
Unknown	57	0	53
Companies' countries	78	18	64
Market segments	114	52	108

**Figure 3: SLDs CDF for impersonated companies per ccTLD.**


companies and services. As such, users are continuously exposed to domains under their respective ccTLD. To a certain extent, a ccTLD may be seen as a *brand*, and humans assign trust levels to brands [43, 76]. Brand trust is a critical aspect of consumer behavior and is a key factor in the success of a brand [68]. Next, we investigate if attackers exploit this association (or trust) in their attacks.

#### 4.1 Companies' profile

We profile the impersonated companies we observed in our phishing datasets (§3.1). In the datasets, each URL includes a company (brand) which was impersonated in the attack. We then extract all listed companies and manually identify both their country of origin and the market segments they operate in. In the case of multinational companies, we use the country of their headquarters. For instance, we classify Netflix as a US-based company, even though it operates globally.

Table 5 shows the results. We see a large number of companies, most of them being *international*, i.e., they are companies based in countries other than those of their ccTLDs (for some companies we could not find out where they operated from, such as some cryptocurrency companies, so we label them as “Unknown”). As such, we can clearly see that ccTLDs are used for phishing attacks *mostly against international companies outside the ccTLDs*, and not to exploit companies in the countries of the ccTLDs.

*Companies phishing attack concentration:* Next, we compute the distribution of the number of SLDs used against each company. Figure 3 shows the CDF for all ccTLDs. Across all ccTLDs, we see two patterns: some companies are targeted using one or a few SLDs, while others experience recurrent attacks. Most companies were targeted using a single SLD (36%, 54%, and 49% of their companies for .nl, .ie, and .be, respectively) or a few. However, few companies were attacked using at least 50 SLDs (9%, 0.1%, 3%).

**Figure 4: Targeted economic sectors.**

*Diverse market segments.* We see many attacked market segments in Table 5. Figure 4 shows the counts of SLDs per segment. We see most phishing attacks are against banks and financial institutions, followed by technology companies. Banks also top the list of APWG phishing reports [6]. Examples of banks include Dutch banks (ING, ABN AMRO), and JP Morgan Chase (US).

The second most popular market segment is technology companies, which include US-based companies such as Microsoft and Apple. Then, we have Internet Services providers such as Yahoo (US), AOL (US) and NetEase (CN). In fourth place, we have Telecoms, such as Freebox (FR), Vodafone (UK), Orange (FR), and a Ziggo (NL). Coincidentally, these market segments were also present in the portfolio of LabHost (§2.3), the phishing-as-a-service provider.

#### 4.2 Companies and country of origin

Next, we compute the number of companies, SLDs, and average and median age of the SLDs used in the attacks, for each country from the impersonated companies. We compute the SLD age by subtracting the phishing notification time from the domain registration time, which we obtain from the registries' databases.

*American companies are the most popular.* Table 6 shows that most impersonated companies are American, for all ccTLDs. Local companies rank #2 in .nl and .be zones, but not in .ie. Given that .ie has a restricted registration policy (§2.1), the results suggest it inhibits phishing against local companies.

*Local phishing uses new domains, International uses compromised domains:* Local companies, for .nl and .be, are attacked with new domain names – they have a median of fewer than 2.5 days – which suggests these are maliciously registered domains. That's a sharp contrast with the age of SLDs targeting American companies. The domains used in these attacks have, on average, more than 5 years of age. Given that these domains are old, we believe them to be *compromised domain names* (§2.3).

*Most impersonated companies.* Table 7 shows the top 5 impersonated companies for the ccTLDs, in terms of SLDs. We see that Microsoft tops the rank for all ccTLDs, with a median age of more than 5 years. Microsoft is an attractive target, given its large user base, and access to such accounts can provide them with e-mails and also a range of internal documents. Microsoft also tops the list of other industry phishing reports [73]. Similarly to Microsoft, we see PayPal among the top 5 for all ccTLDs. We see that two local business, a local bank (#3) and a financial service provider (#4),

**Table 6: Impersonated companies and their countries.**

The Netherlands ccTLD (.nl)					
Country	Companies	SLDs	URLs	Avg. Age	Med. Age
All	1,054	26,740	125,304	1,829.6	1,641.0
US	268	13,205	69,851	1,600.0	1,751.5
NL	58	6,084	31,063	208.2	2.5
FR	55	1,532	8,434	1,762.0	1,766.2
GB	66	1,096	5,327	1,991.5	2,163.7
Rest	607	5,693	23,123	1,737.0	1,988.5
Ireland ccTLD (.ie)					
Country	Companies	SLDs	URLs	Avg. Age	Med. Age
All	206	555	4,542	3,062.9	2,746.0
US	66	363	2,781	3,406.1	3,310.0
FR	15	47	574	2,475.6	2,102.0
DE	12	44	293	2,986.2	2,958.0
GB	9	16	48	2,849.0	2,834.0
Rest	92	135	782	2,932.1	2,445.5
Belgium ccTLD (.be)					
Country	Companies	SLDs	URLs	Avg. Age	Med. Age
All	546	2,810	27,346	3,231.1	2,154.0
US	126	1,647	17,095	3,022.1	1,922.5
BE	33	254	1,480	1,522.1	2.0
FR	41	211	1,681	2,435.3	1,661.0
DE	23	205	1,816	3,151.7	2,877.0
Rest	323	684	5,286	3,595.1	2,888.0

**Table 7: Top 5 impersonated companies for each ccTLD. Yellow rows are from local companies, blue rows are common companies in the three ccTLDs. Age is median in days.**

The Netherlands ccTLD (.nl)					
Company	SLDs	Age	CC	Sector	
Microsoft	2,319	2,251.0	US	Technology	
PayPal	2,134	1,751.0	US	Financial Serv.	
ING Netherlands	1,815	1.0	NL	Banking	
International Card Services	1,410	2.0	NL	Financial Serv.	
Apple	1,276	1,775.0	US	Technology	
Ireland ccTLD (.ie)					
Microsoft	135	2,598.0	US	Technology	
Webmail	60	1,921.0	US	Internet Services	
Netflix	46	2,792.0	US	Entertainment	
PayPal	24	2,279.0	US	Financial Serv.	
DHL	21	2,301.0	DE	Logistics	
Belgium ccTLD (.be)					
Microsoft	424	2,016.0	US	Technology	
Webmail	284	1,368.0	US	Internet Services	
Netflix	170	3,039.0	US	Entertainment	
PayPal	133	1,829.0	US	Financial Serv.	
DHL	118	3,239.0	DE	Logistics	

are also impersonated using many SLDs, which shows that local companies are also frequently impersonated, but with new domain names. We include the top 10 companies per ccTLD in §C in [59].

Not every local company is impersonated using new domain names. Figure 5 shows all local (Dutch) companies impersonated using .nl domains, and their number of SLDs and median age. The most popular impersonated local companies (left y axis) are prominently targeted using new domains (right y axis), but some are not. We see the same patterns in .be (Figures in §D in [59]).

*Consistency over time.* We compute the median age per country, per year. We see that the results are consistent over time: local companies are impersonated often with maliciously registered domain names. We show the figures results in §D in [59]. We also see that Belgian companies are also impersonated using .nl domains. We discuss this overlap in §4.4.

**Table 8: Segments and countries of impersonated companies for maliciously registered domains (< 7 days). Rows in yellow refer to segments from local companies.**

.nl				
Segment	CC	SLDs	Companies	Med. Age (days)
Banking	NL	4,165	15	1.1
Financial Services	NL	1,417	3	1.4
Banking	BE	610	14	2.9
Credit Union	US	335	34	4.7
E-commerce	NL	283	1	2.3
Government Services	NL	178	4	0.8
Telecom	NL	141	9	1.8
Postal Services	NL	109	1	0.9
Domain Registry	NL	93	1	4.5
Online Identity Management	NL	80	1	1.8
.be				
Banking	BE	180	11	0.9
Credit Union	US	82	10	0.7
Banking	NL	64	7	1.0
Government Services	BE	29	2	5.7
Insurance	BE	29	1	1.2
Postal Services	BE	25	1	1.3
E-commerce	BE	11	1	0.8
Insurance	FR	9	1	2.1
Government	AR	5	1	0.7
Financial Services	BE	5	1	0.5

### 4.3 What are new domains used for?

We see that local companies are primarily targeted using newly registered domain names. Next, we turn to investigate what all new domains are used for. In the literature, many research works classify maliciously registered domains (new domains) if they are younger than 30 or 90 days by the time the phishing attack is deployed. We instead look into our datasets, and show what domain ages we see when the phishing attack is detected.

Figure 6 shows the CDF of the SLDs’ age for each ccTLD, for all phishing domains. For .nl and .be, we see that there is not much difference between a week and 90 days in the number of SLDs, so instead we choose seven days – a stricter value.


Then, we proceed to group them by segment and country of origin from the impersonated brands. Table 8 shows the results. We see that most of the SLDs are used to impersonate local banks, but also e-commerce, government, and telecommunications (we omit .ie given it has very few SLDs in the first week). We see that Dutch banks rank #3 in phishing in the .be zone, and vice-versa.

### 4.4 ccTLDs and targeted companies compared

Our datasets revealed 1,233 targeted companies from 86 countries across all ccTLDs (distribution shown in Table 5). We compile the set of brands for each ccTLD and compute their intersections, and show the results as a Venn diagram in Figure 8. Next we explore the characteristics of each of these subsets in the figure.

*4.4.1 Common companies among the ccTLDs.* From the 1,233 companies we saw in our datasets, only 139 (11% of the total, highlighted text color matching Figure 7 and Figure 8) are found in all ccTLDs. Companies in this subset include Microsoft, PayPal, Apple, Google, and Netflix, which have a global presence and large user base (we list them in §E in [59]).

*Companies characteristics:* What distinguishes them from the others? We find that they are mostly *international/global* (133 from



**Figure 5: Dutch companies: number of .nl SLDs used in attacks, and median age, sorted by number of SLDs.**

24 countries, Figure 7), they are *popular* with attackers (they account for 58.6% of all SLDs used in phishing attacks in our datasets, or 21k SLDs out of 37k), and attacks against them are mostly done using *old domains* (having at least 5.4 years median age, or 1,967 days).

*Attacker profile:* As such, we can infer that attackers who targeted these companies used mostly compromised domain names (given they are old domains), regardless of the ccTLD. For these attackers, it does not matter if the phishing URL is a specific TLD; they leverage vulnerable, exploitable and thus free websites.


The exception to this are two Belgian organizations that have been phished using 376 .nl SLDs, with an median age of four days. These two organizations are the Government of Belgium and an International bank headquartered in Belgium. We speculate that this is also influenced by their sharing of one common language, which allows an attack group to use this language to attack companies in both countries.

**4.4.2 ccTLDs exclusively targeted companies.** Next we look in the other end of spectrum: what companies are only impersonated in one ccTLD? And why?

Most of the companies in our dataset are only found in the .nl zone – 639 companies. We attribute this partially to the fact that .nl is the largest zone of the three (Table 1), which creates the largest attack surface, and that the .nl dataset covers 10 years while the others cover 4 years.

When we compare the companies impersonated only in the .nl zone (or the 147 companies only in the .be zone), we see the same pattern: most are international, so it follows the same attacker profile as §4.4.1. However, 42 local Dutch companies are impersonated using only .nl domain names, from a total of 60 Dutch companies we saw in all ccTLDs. Local ones are impersonated with newly registered domain names (median age of 4 days). Among these local companies, a popular online marketplace tops the list (Marktplaats [54]), followed by the national mail company.

*Attacker profile:* we see two attacker profiles. The first one consists of attackers who exploit any domain name they can find – just like in §4.4.1. However, we see an attacker’s profile that exploits the trust Internet users have in their ccTLD: they register new domains under the ccTLD of their targeted companies, and get to choose domain names in the process. We analyze these domain names’ strings and see they are in Dutch words, which, in turn, raises the bar for the attacker, suggesting these attacks are likely to come from



**Figure 6: Domain age CDF by notification date.**

individuals or groups operating locally or in neighboring countries speaking the same language.

*.ie exclusive companies:* We see only 20 companies, 17 being international and 3 local among the .ie exclusive companies. The attacks use only 22 SLDs. Given these small numbers, we think these companies only impersonated with .ie domain names are incidental, using old, compromised domain names. Restricted registration inhibits malicious registered domain names. However, there have been cases of malicious registrations within the .ie zone. In a particular case, 120 domains were maliciously registered using falsified identification documents. The registration occurred on a Friday, and over the weekend, .ie received reports of abuse associated with these domains. Subsequently, these domains were deactivated. This incident indicates that attackers attempt to circumvent restricted registration policies by employing counterfeit documentation.

**4.4.3 .nl and .be only companies.** We find 247 companies impersonated using .nl and .be exclusively. Out of these, 32 are “local”, being either Dutch or Belgian. However, they account for 70% of the SLDs in this subset, with a median age of two days, indicating they are maliciously registered. In fact, most of SLDs used against Dutch and Belgian companies fall into this category, *i.e.*, they are impersonated using *both* ccTLDs.

This finding demonstrates the need for registries to collaborate to mitigate phishing in their own countries. By mitigating .be phishing SLDs, it protects Dutch users, and vice-versa. In this way, the mitigation methods employed in one zone affect the users in the other ccTLD country. These local companies are impersonated by the attacker profile described in §4.4.2, in which they use new domain names crafted to mimic the legitimate website.

We wonder if this is a consequence of having phishing kits tailored for banks in both countries. Given that many banks operate in both countries, and they share the same language, it is relatively easy to phish for clients in both countries using the same domain. We find 82 SLDs in the .nl zone that were used exclusively to phish Dutch and Belgian companies, with a median age of 1.29 days, while we found 2 .be SLDs with a median age of 5.56 days doing the same.

The remaining subsets have mostly compromised domain names, and we include its characteristics in §F in [59]. We also investigate time correlation between impersonated brands attacks between the ccTLDs and found a weak correlation (§G in [59]).



Subset	Companies	Countries	SLDs			Median age (days)			
			.nl	.ie	.be	.nl	.ie	.be	
∪ all	1,233	86	37,215	32,762	728	3,725	1,641	2,746	2,154
∩ all	139	27	21,175	18,040	651	2,484	1,938	2,739	1,921
Intl. companies	133	24	20,090	17,084	636	2,370	1,971	2,748	1,967
Dutch companies	2	1	573	549	6	18	659	3,460	614
Irish companies	2	1	61	31	6	24	3,570	3,535	3,599
Belgian companies	2	1	451	376	3	72	4	1,695	812
<b>.nl only</b>	<b>639</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>3,888</b>	<b>3,888</b>	–	–	<b>1,602</b>	–	–
Intl. companies	597	69	2,808	2,808	–	–	1,756	–	–
Dutch companies	42	1	1,080	1,080	–	–	4	–	–
<b>.ie only</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>22</b>	–	<b>22</b>	–	–	<b>2,398</b>	–
Intl. companies	17	11	19	–	19	–	–	2,255	–
Irish companies	3	1	3	–	3	–	–	2,540	–
<b>.be only</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>213</b>	–	–	<b>213</b>	–	–	<b>5,671</b>
Intl. companies	135	37	164	–	–	164	–	–	6,340
Belgian companies	12	1	49	–	–	49	–	–	108
<b>(.nl ∩ .be) - ∩ all</b>	<b>247</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>11,611</b>	<b>10,603</b>	–	<b>1,008</b>	<b>1,394</b>	–	<b>1,969</b>
Intl. companies	215	49	3,673	3,064	–	609	1,585	–	2,490
Dutch companies	13	1	7,151	7,061	–	90	1	–	2
Belgian companies	19	1	787	478	–	309	2	–	2

Figure 7: Subsets characteristics. SLDs refers to non-unique SLDs, given a same SLD can be used for multiple companies.




Figure 8: Venn diagram of impersonated companies.

## 5 Mitigation


### 5.1 Mitigation in practice

Phishing mitigation is not a single event carried out by a single actor. In practice, we see actions taken by registrars, registries, hosting providers, webmasters, all happening independently to mitigate phishing attacks. We demonstrate this in two examples (Figure 9), drawn from two phishing attacks observed in the .nl zone. We include their screenshot captured independently by our crawler in §H in [59].


**French Bank Phishing:** In Figure 9a, we show the timeline of a phishing domain used to impersonate a French bank, which was mitigated only at the web level and left to expire at the DNS level. This figure is made with a combination of various datasets. From Netcraft, we extract the phishing notification and mitigation time, and plot them as dashed lines, relative to the mitigation time. From the .nl registration database, we retrieve the domain registration time, and plot it as a green dashed line ( $t=-39h$ ).

The remaining data points are web measurements obtained from our in-house crawler, which crawls every domain name multiple times after registration (§3.2). Up to  $t=-27h$ , our crawler cannot find a website, so we mark it as unreachable. Then, between  $-25h$  and  $-1h$ , our crawler fetches the phishing site: the .nl domain redirects the crawler to a .click domain, where the actual phishing is hosted. We know this is the phishing site given it matches the data reported by Netcraft. This redirect takes place at web level, using HTTP redirects [23].

Netcraft detects the phishing site and notifies at  $t=-7h$  (so it took seven hours to mitigate it). After the mitigation time reported by Netcraft, our crawler data confirms the mitigation (it cannot retrieve the phishing website any longer). Then, around  $t=10h$ , the website becomes reachable again, but instead of the phishing site, we now see a default landing page of the hosting provider. Lastly, after  $t=200h$ , the website becomes unreachable again, and our crawler does not crawl it anymore. This domain was then left by the registrar to expire, meaning it was not deleted before the end of its 1-year lease.



(a) Web level phishing mitigation of a French bank



(b) DNS level mitigation of Tinder phishing

Figure 9: Phishing mitigation examples.

**Tinder Phishing:** Figure 9b shows the timeline of a domain used to impersonate the dating site Tinder, which was mitigated at both web and DNS levels. We make the graphs following the same steps as in Figure 9a. This website was detected by .nl analysts (and not Netcraft) and inserted into Netcraft to use their notification services. The website was then cleaned up (see HTTP 403 error) and then deleted from the .nl zone by the registrar.

Comparing both cases, we see that French bank phishing was mitigated by the hosting provider or webmaster and the domain name was left to expire, whereas the Tinder phishing was first mitigated at the web level and then at the DNS level by the registrar. These two examples demonstrate the different ways and actors that can mitigate phishing sites.




Figure 10: DNS mitigation: new domains.

## 5.2 Phishing mitigation at the DNS level

Next, we focus on DNS-level mitigation, by analyzing the registries' registration databases. Before we analyze the results, we divide the datasets into two: new domains and old domains. The rationale is that new domains tend to be maliciously registered, while old domains tend to be compromised websites. As discussed in §2.5, they require different mitigation methods. We choose a threshold of 7 days to classify a domain as maliciously registered, following the analysis shown in §4.3. Given our datasets span over many years, some SLDs can be registered several times in the period, so we consider each new registration independently.

**5.2.1 New domains mitigation.** Figure 10 summarizes the DNS mitigation results, for new domain names (< 7 days), for .nl and .be (we omit .ie due to its low number of maliciously registered domains). We show the chain of events that lead to mitigation at the DNS level.

**Policy impact: who acts first?** Recall the ccTLDs abuse handling policies (§2.6); .nl first allows other parties to mitigate, while .be often takes action first. We see clearly in Figure 10 how these policies reflect in the results: roughly 50% of the .nl maliciously registered domains are deleted by the *registrars*, and less than 1% by the registry. For .be, we see 71% of deletes – the registry being responsible for 50% and the registrars for another 21%. We see that most of the malicious .be domains are first suspended (removed from the zone) or have their DNS records changed, which conforms to the policy of .be.

**Disposable domains:** we see that the majority of the new domains are either deleted or simply not renewed (expired). These account

for 96.5% for .nl, and 89.9% for .be, thus we can conclude that they are disposable – attackers likely make enough profits within the period that the phishing website is active, and have no interest in renewing it.

**Mitigation speed:** once a phishing website is active, speed is of the essence to prevent successful attacks. We show in Figure 11 the time it takes to mitigate a phishing attack after its notification by Netcraft. For .be, we see that 60% of the .be domains are suspended or have their NS records changed in the first day, compared to 40% for .nl (Figure 11a). Out of the 269 .be domains, 239 (88.8%) were suspended by the .be registry itself. For .nl, however, 720 domains (out of 6218, 11.5%) had NS changed, all by their registrars.

**Domain deletions take longer.** We see in Figure 11b how fast domains are deleted for each ccTLD. For .be, we see a significant increase at 15 days – this conforms to their policy of waiting two weeks before proceeding with a delete. For .nl, we see spikes around 30, 60 days, and one year. Given that virtually all deletes are performed by the registrar, these are a consequence of their policies of deleting domains after certain intervals. As such, for both registries, we see that deleting is often resorted to as a second step in the mitigation strategy.

**5.2.2 Old domain names mitigation.** The majority of old SLDs are renewed post mitigation, for the three ccTLDs (59% for .nl, 94% for .ie, and 79.3% for .be). We believe this is because old domains tend to be *compromised* and then cleaned up at the web level, while we do not see changes at the DNS level.

This matches our intuition that domain names of compromised websites are valuable and thus not disposable. Their registrants have an interest in keeping these domain names active, so they are renewed, after removing the harmful content from the website.

Interestingly, however, we see that 27% of old domains from .nl are deleted. We investigated this and we found it was due to one registrar deleting domains on the 12th day after notification – due to its own policy. So these domains could also be labeled as maliciously registered, which would increase the renew ratio for .nl. We include the CDFs of domain name delete and NS record changes in § D in [59], as well as the mitigation figures.

## 5.3 Phishing mitigation seen from crawlers

Next we analyze data obtained from web crawlers that visit phishing websites. These crawlers mimic user behavior when attempting to access a phishing URL, though some sites may use cloaking techniques to mislead crawlers [84].

We first start with the results reported by Netcraft. For each SLD, we compute its mitigation time, which we define as the time between the Netcraft notification to resolution *i.e.*, when the phishing attack was mitigated – either at DNS and/or web level – so it cannot be reached by a browser. We have this data only for .nl and .ie, given these ccTLDs subscribed to their notification services (§2.7), and, as such, have the phishing URLs tracked by Netcraft.

Figure 11c shows the results. We see that for .nl, both new and old domains are mitigated at comparable speeds, even if old domains account for 75% of all .nl compromised domains (Table 2). .ie, in turn, has faster mitigation times – 40% mitigation within the first hour, while .nl reaches only 20%. After 24h, 80% of the .nl domains are mitigated while roughly 70% of the .ie are mitigated.




Figure 11: Phishing mitigation times.

We speculate that this is due to the different environments both operate in – different registrars, hosting providers, and so forth – and the number of domain names (.nl sees roughly 10× more phishing domains than .ie).

When compared to DNS level mitigations seen at the registry (Figure 11a and Figure 11b), we see that the web mitigation times for .nl are significantly shorter than DNS mitigation. Specifically, 40% of the maliciously registered .nl SLDs have their NS records changed on the first day, while web mitigation data shows 80% mitigation on the first day post-notification.

Why such difference? Results from Figure 11c are a compound of *all* sorts of mitigations at all levels (§2.5) by all intermediaries: DNS and Web mitigations by registries, registrars, hosting providers, DNS providers, and webmasters. As such, it reflects a more realistic view of mitigation.

*Is this mitigation fast enough?* The mitigation shown in Figure 11c shows time intervals after notification – however, as shown in Figure 9, phishing sites can go unnoticed for hours. This interval – detection time – combined with mitigation time – may be enough time for phishing attacks to be profitable. Therefore, reducing both intervals should be the goal for registries wishing to reduce phishing attacks in their zones.

**5.3.1 Can we trust mitigation times from Netcraft?** The mitigation times reported by Netcraft are used by decision makers within the registry to guide policies and strategies. Given that they are self-reported using vantage-points inaccessible to us, we cannot validate them, especially considering they span over 10 years.

We can, however, validate parts of the reports, using the same methodology we described to build the timelines of phishing attacks in §5.1. Not all cases adhere to the patterns shown. § I in [59] shows cases involving undetectable phishing web cloaking, domain deletes, and undetected instances.

We analyze all phishing SLDs from 2022, totaling 1,925 reported by Netcraft to the .nl zone. We focus on domains no older than 7 days at notification time, yielding 322 domains. We have data points for 234 SLDs before and after Netcraft’s reported mitigation time. The missing data is due to individual crawl runs that did not start.

We examine web mitigation for 234 phishing sites in the .nl ccTLD. Each web measurement point from our crawler is classified as HTTP 200 (active site), Web mitigation (HTTP [3-4-5]\*, indicating HTTP 300, 400, and 500 errors [23]), or unreachable. If a domain has multiple statuses post-mitigation, we consider its last status.

Figure 12 presents a Sankey diagram of the 234 new SLDs pre and post-mitigation. Most domains (195) had a website, but the majority (119) became unreachable post-mitigation. In total, 140 SLDs are unreachable post-mitigation. Another 61 SLDs that had an active website post-mitigation returned another website, mostly landing or default pages.

We observe evidence of mitigation before Netcraft’s timestamp (Unreachable and HTTP [3-4-5]\* in Figure 12). We found no evidence of phishing websites being served post-mitigation. Figure 13 shows the age of each of the 234 SLDs at mitigation time and when it was deleted from the .nl zone. We see a concentration of domains being deleted on the mitigation day ( $x = y$ ), and at one year – when they expire. The majority of these domains remain active even after their web mitigation.

This subset of SLDs thus corroborates Netcraft’s reported mitigation times – our crawler, run from independent vantage points, did not find any phishing web sites *after* Netcraft’s self-reported mitigation time for these 234 SLDs. As such, we have no evidence to not trust the mitigation times reported by Netcraft shown in Figure 11c.

**5.3.2 Can we reduce detection times?** Reducing phishing detection and mitigation time is key to disincentivize attacks in a TLD. Next we perform a post-mortem analysis of our crawling data to determine if phishing websites could be earlier identified, as shown in Figure 9, in which our crawler had found the phishing site *before* the notification. We cannot do this at scale retroactively, only for the domains we already had data on. We start with the 234 domains we discussed in §5.3.1 – which are all new domains. Out of those, only 36 had a phishing website at their home page – thus visible to our independent crawler (many phishing attacks hide their phishing sites in subdomains or subdirectories).

We then manually analyze their HTML title and HTML descriptions fields, and screenshots, and see if there are indications of the phishing site, and when. For example, if a phishing site had been reported impersonating Microsoft, we look at HTML title and description before and after Netcraft’s notification, and screenshots, and see when the phishing site was first seen from our vantage point, if it was seen. We perform this analysis manually. From the 36 sites, we saw 18 with phishing sites either from the HTML title or description or from the screenshots.

Figure 14 shows the results. Even though it is a small set of domains, we see that 16 out of the 18 could have been possibly detected, using data available at the registry, given they were able




Figure 12: Sankey diagram of 234 SLDs using active web measurements from our crawler.




Figure 13: SLDs: age by mitigation and domain delete at .nl for new domains from 2022.




Figure 14: Phishing detection, notification, and mitigation.

Table 9: Phishing attack strategies

	Maliciously Registered	Compromised Domains
Bio. Analogy	Aggressive mimicry	Aggressive mimicry & parasitism
Share SLDs	20.00%	80.00%
Leverage ccTLD Trust Use	Yes Local company or operating locally	Likely no Any, mostly international
Targeted Companies	< 5%	>95%
Restricted Reg. Detection Mitigation	Mitigated Easier DNS, Web	Not Mitigated More Difficult Mostly Web

to retrieve the phishing website before the Netcraft notification. For the other two, Netcraft notified before our crawl runs.

Although these few domains may not be representative for the entire dataset, it shows that we could reduce detection time for some newly registered domain names that host phishing in their home pages. We intend to investigate this as future work.

## 6 Discussion

Our analysis unveils two classes of attacks (Table 9), namely, those who prefer a do-it-yourself tactic, by registering and hosting their own domains and sites, and others that prefer to misuse someone else’s hosting, by compromising their websites; we refer to the latter as “parasitism” tactic. Roughly 80% of phishing SLDs we observe are compromised domains.

We can only speculate why these strategies exist. Maliciously registered domain names enable better mimicry, as attackers can pick more convincing domains. For instance, instead of compromising a domain like `joesbbqhouston.net` for bank phishing, they can use a crafted domain such as `citibank-validate-card.com`. Additionally, choosing the same top-level domain (TLD) as the target company enhances overall mimicry effectiveness. However, it has financial costs. Compromised domains, in turn, are *cheaper* (as they require no domain registration, hosting, or DNS setup). They also make attack *attribution more difficult* since few traces are left beyond exploiting the compromised website. Additionally, leveraging an existing domain’s benign reputation and achieving scalability without costs are advantages (previous research has

demonstrated that websites are frequently scanned for vulnerabilities of CMSes [83]).

*Generalization of our findings:* Our findings are based on an analysis of three ccTLDs. Although we did not evaluate other TLDs, we believe that similar behaviors may be prevalent, particularly concerning compromised domains used for phishing. We would not be surprised if our observations also hold for registries with similar registration policies to those evaluated in this paper. As future work, we intend to collaborate with other TLDs to determine if the same behaviors can be found.

### 6.1 Call for action

We present the following action points based on our findings:

*More research on compromised domains is needed.* Most research works focus on maliciously registered domain names (e.g., [27]). We need new solutions to detect compromised domains, given they form the bulk of SLDs. It is a challenge, given we cannot use registration or certificate features in the process, such as domain name or hosting infrastructure. Given they are parasites to legitimate websites, they leverage the reputation of their host. At the registry, we could use authoritative server traffic to detect suspicious domains (we demonstrate an example in §A in [59]). However, it is challenging to validate the results: we cannot know from DNS queries the full URL of phishing attacks. Collaboration with hosting providers may be used in such cases in an attempt to validate results. In the meantime, blocklists, reactive by nature, will remain essential in detection of compromised domains.

*Increase collaboration between ccTLDs to mitigate phishing:* The results presented in §4.4 reveal that attackers frequently utilize many maliciously registered domains from one ccTLD to target companies in neighboring countries. In this context, mitigating domains within the .be zone not only protects users in Belgium but also benefits users in The Netherlands, and vice versa. Therefore, fostering collaboration between ccTLD registries is essential to reduce the uptime of phishing sites and improve user protection against scams. Note, however, that mitigating phishing at one TLD may drive attackers to another one (e.g., [53]). Overall, the goal is to make it more expensive or difficult for them to succeed.

*Revising registration and abuse handling policies in ccTLDs:* This study represents the first comprehensive examination and comparison of abuse handling policies and registration policies across ccTLDs and their impact on phishing mitigation. Our research demonstrates that while a restricted registration policy effectively combats maliciously registered domain names, it falls short in addressing compromised domain names. Additionally, we show that

.be adopts a more active approach to mitigation compared to .nl in terms of suspending domain names, whereas .nl waits intermediaries to first mitigate, and takes action after 66h.

Mitigation efforts are intricate and involve multiple stakeholders working independently and concurrently (§5). These findings are currently under discussion within the three ccTLDs, spanning legal, management, and abuse handling departments. Consequently, policy adjustments may be implemented to enhance abuse mitigation. Furthermore, our analysis in §5.3.2 highlights the potential for ccTLD registries to reduce phishing uptime by leveraging their own data.

## 6.2 Limitations

Our study has the following limitations. First, we focus only on phishing seen at three ccTLDs. While many studies have compared and analyzed abuse among multiple TLDs, our focus is on three ccTLDs given we have access to the entire activity of ccTLDs over years and a high quality blacklist and private datasets, providing us with a complete view within these three zones.

We intended to include more ccTLDs in our study; however, obtaining such datasets proved challenging. Many TLD registries lack dedicated research departments or personnel focused on research activities, thereby making it difficult to allocate time for such analyses. The absence of previous research papers combining these datasets underscores this challenge. We intend to share our code with other TLDs and coordinate future research efforts, with the aim of expanding our collaborative network.

Our analysis uses the number of SLDs as the primary metric (as do the majority of studies). However, the ideal metric for assessing the severity of individual phishing attacks would involve evaluating the specific financial losses incurred by each attack. Unfortunately, this information is not accessible to us. In our attempt to gather insights, we contacted representatives from two banks. Regrettably, they informed us that losses resulting from individual phishing attacks are intentionally compartmentalized within their institutions and cannot be disclosed – and they refused even to elaborate on why. Despite this limitation, the recurring nature of phishing attacks shows that phishing remains profitable.

## 7 Related work

**Phishing analysis.** There are two primary works closely related to ours. Oest *et al.* [65] focus on analyzing phishing attacks against a large payment provider, spanning over a year, using web server logs. Differently from them, we do not have access to web server logs. We also do not limit ourselves to a specific target organization; we analyze all phishing we see in three ccTLDs, and cover 28k SLDs spanning from four to 10 years.

Bijmans *et al.* [11] focus on phishing attacks against banks based in the Netherlands. They use certificate transparency logs [13] in their detection process, therefore focusing on new domain names. They were able to find 1.3k suspicious SLDs, in a 4 month period. We in turn, focus on any segment of phishing – not only banking – and rely upon a phishing blacklist provider instead spanning 4 to 10 years. We report 28.7k SLDs, 80% being compromised domain names. While they report many TLDs, we cover only three. They

find that most phishing on Dutch banks is from .info domain names, which are cheaper than .nl domains.

**Malicious domain names detection.** Three works [26–28] delve into the domain registration process of spam domains, with a focus on identifying features hinting at potential malicious intent during registration, before any attack occurs. Their investigation encompasses a thorough analysis of registrar characteristics, lifetimes, registration surges, and naming patterns.

**Malicious domains vs comprised domains.** Distinguishing compromised domains from maliciously registered has been covered in many works [8, 16, 49, 55]. These studies are primarily focused on the categorization process and do not extend their analysis to include abuse handling procedures, the impersonation of companies, and lifespan of phishing websites. Our research addresses this gap.

**Short-lived domain names.** Two studies have shown how domains involved in malicious activities tend to be *deleted* from the DNS zone before their expiration date [3, 7], suggesting this is a consequence of the takedown efforts. We see similar patterns for .be, where 68.2% of maliciously registered SLDs are deleted, while .nl sees half of its domains being deleted. Their research, however, does not delve into the takedown policies of TLD registries or compromised domain names.

**Mitigation.** One study interviewed 24 experts in taking down domain names and concluded that law enforcement agencies are not very effective in taking websites down compared with the specialist companies [31]. Another study covered notice and take-down of various types of cybercrime – including phishing attacks, and their impact in the incentive structures involved [58]. A subsequent study then measured phishing sites lifetimes to effectiveness of takedown strategies employed by targeted institutions [57].

Phishing lifetimes at TLD level have been investigated [44]. However, the study does not delve deeper into whether these domains were taken down at the DNS or hosting level, nor does it analyze the takedown strategies employed by TLD registries. The role of hosting providers and web masters in preventing domain names from being compromised and misused for phishing has been addressed as well [78]. Lastly, another work showed a detailed perspective on the domain takedown process at the DNS level [4]. They examine the practice of mitigating across various types of organizations, including registries and registrars. In this paper, we approach phishing from a distinctly different perspective—examining the takedown policies of three ccTLD registries concerning compromised and maliciously registered domain names.

**Policy change:** A previous study has shown the impact of spamming domains when the China’s .cn registry restricted its domains registration and increase prices at the same time [53]. It caused spamming domains to move to other TLDs.

## 8 Conclusion

Phishing on the Web continues to be one of the most devastating cyber threats, contributing to hundreds of millions of US Dollars in losses for individuals and companies. In this paper, for the first time, we perform a longitudinal study in collaboration with three ccTLDs that spans up to 10 years and considers more than 8 million domains to characterize phishing tactics in recent years. Our

analysis of the entire namespace of three ccTLDs shows that cybercriminals use two phishing tactics: compromising pre-existing legit domains and maliciously registering new ones. Further investigation unveils that more than a vast majority of these phishing domains are old domains, likely compromised websites (80% of total). We also show that compromised domains are used primarily to impersonate international companies at a meager cost by parasitizing well-established and legitimate domains, while most of the new maliciously registered domains are used to impersonate local companies. Our findings challenge current best practices that focus on scrutinizing newly registered domains or restricted registration policies by ccTLDs, as they can only be effective for a relatively small fraction of phishing activity (less than 20% based on our study). Fighting against compromised domains is much more challenging and is a call for action for closer collaboration with hosters, registrars, and ccTLDs. Our results have already been taken into consideration in the revision of policies by ccTLDs that we collaborate with. As part of our future agenda, we plan to extend our collaboration with additional ccTLDs to characterize the evolving phishing activity better and enhance the mitigation of phishing on the Web.

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